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Tax Policy as a Lifeline:
Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation Through
Tax Credits
Joseph B. Clamon, J.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION

Blood, organ, and tissue donation provide unique opportunities to assist
others. Technology now exists to transfuse blood and transplant a plethora
of organs including hearts, lungs, kidneys, livers, and intestines, among
others. The ability to save a life through blood transfusions and organ
transplants, however, has been significantly limited by a serious and
chronic shortage of blood and organs suitable for infusion and
transplantation.' Thousands of patients die awaiting transplants each year
due to the lack of available organs.2 The problem of blood shortages is

equally significant, particularly after a major catastrophic event such as a
terrorist attack or natural disaster.3
An inadequate supply of donors is the major reason for the shortage of
transplantable blood and organs.4 Although estimates of the number of
deaths that "occur each year under circumstances that would allow for
removal and transplantation of cadaver organs vary widely, all such
estimates reveal a substantial pool of potential organ donors who, for a
* J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 2004; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2001. I
would like to thank Professor Richard Koontz, Michael Fine, Dr. Gerald Clamon, and
Matthew Smith for their assistance with this article. Any errors are my own.
1. See generally Kathleen Kingsbury, Donor Deal, TIME, June 25, 2007, at 53 ("About
90% of Americans say they support organ donation, but only 30% have actually signed up to
part with their parts after they die.").
2. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Data, http://www.optn.org/
data/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). As of October 24, 97,910 people were awaiting an organ
transplant of one or more organs. In comparison, only 19,249 transplants were performed
nationwide between January and August 2007 from 9,759 donors. Id.
3.
Becky Orfinger, Red Cross Calls NationalBlood Shortage 'A Disaster',IN THE NEWS,
2000, http://www.redcross.org/news/archives/2000/7-12a-00.html.
4. Kelly A. Carroll, Does How We Ask for Organs Determine Whether People Decide to
Donate?, VIRTUAL MENTOR, September 2005, available at http://virtualmentor.amaassn.org/2005/09/jdsc 1-0509.html.
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variety of reasons, fail to supply the needed organs."5 According to one
estimate, only 49.8% of eligible cadaveric donors become actual donors. 6
Other estimates suggest that the potential number of organ donors is at least
double the existing number of actual donors.7 The shortage of potential
organ donors is exacerbated by the fact that only two percent of donors
Inefficient procurement
meet the medical requirements to donate. 8
practices further decrease the number of viable organ donors. 9 Although
the number of potential blood donors is not known for certain, most of the
general public, with the exception of people with certain conditions or
illnesses, possess the ability to donate blood. 0 Many blood banks estimate
that sixty percent of the United States population is eligible to donate blood,
although only five percent of potential blood donors actually donate."
People choose not to donate for a vast array of reasons. The most
prevalent reasons why people choose not to donate include moral
opposition to the concept of organ donation, religious beliefs that oppose
organ donation and/or blood transfusion, desire to keep the body intact
posthumously, confusion about the process, fear of donation, reliance on
myths about how organs are obtained (e.g., the urban myths of the person
having their kidney stolen and being placed in a tub of ice), inability to
control who will receive the organs, and failure by anyone to inquire about
an individual's donative wishes. 2
In response to this critical shortage, scholars and legislators have
proposed various mechanisms for increasing the amount of blood and
5. David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 567, 568 (2002). See generally Roger W. Evans et al., The Potential of
Organ Donors, 267 JAMA 239 (1992); Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Organ Donor Potential
and Performance: Size and Nature of Organ Donor Shortfall, 24 CRITICAL CARE MED. 34

(1996).
6. Carroll, supra note 4.
7. Kaserman, supra note 5, at 568.
8.

HMS Researchers Address Transplant Organ Shortage, HARVARD UNIv. GAZETTE,

October 2, 2003, http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/10.02/2 I-organs.html.
9. Id.
10. Puget Sound Blood Center, Blood Fact Sheet, http://www.psbc.org/programs/
blood fact sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007); Department of Health and Human
Services, Who Can Donate, http://www.organdonor.gov/donation/whodonate.htm (last
visited Nov. 23, 2007).
Facts,
Blood
Center,
Blood
DeGowin
of
Iowa
11. University
http://www.uihealthcare.com/depts/degowinbloodcenter/facts.html (last visited Nov. 23,
2007) (citing "AABB," formerly known as the American Association of Blood Banks,
available at www.aab.org); Stanford Blood Center, Stanford Blood Center Facts,
http:/Ibloodcenter.stanford.edu/press/press-kit.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
12. See American Red Cross, Top 10 Reasons Why People Don't Give Blood,
http://www.givelife2.org/donor/topl0excuses.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2007); Mayo Clinic,
Organ Donation: Don't Let Myths Stand in Your Way, Apr. 4, 2007,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/organ-donation/FLOO077 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
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number of organs available. 13 Many scholars have suggested adopting a
commercial system in which donors are reimbursed in some manner for
their donation.' 4 Proposals have included direct payment, death benefit, or
the creation of a futures market in organs.' 5 Other scholars have proposed
noncommercial solutions, including systems involving presumed consent,
mandated choice, paired organ exchanges, or mutual insurance.' 6 Serious
concerns accompany each of these proposals. For example, some argue that
commercial systems offend traditional notions of giving, disrespect
potential donors' wishes, and infuse financial considerations into a potential
donor's decision-making process.17 An alternative proposal that addresses
these concerns is to encourage donation through the establishment of more
favorable tax treatment for blood and organ donations through the use of
tax credits.
This article proposes the use of this type of alternative approach-to
employ tax policy to encourage blood and organ donation. Section II
discusses the current regulatory environment controlling donation and the
tax code's treatment of donation. Section III explores the possible
development of commercial and noncommercial systems of blood, tissue,
and organ donation, evaluates the problems with these systems, and
explains why they are not the appropriate ways to encourage donation.
Section IV analyzes alternative solutions based on tax policy and proposes
an alternative solution that encourages blood and organ donation through
the use of a tax credit. Section V concludes with the development of a
model tax code statute that provides a tax credit for blood and organ
donation that will encourage donation while eliminating the ethical and
logistical problems posed by other proposals.
II. CURRENT

REGULATION OF BLOOD AND ORGAN DONATION

The law addressing blood transfusion and organ transplantation is vast
and complex.' 8 This section surveys the influential law that bears on the
13. See Rob Stein, New Zeal in Organ Procurement, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2007, at Al.
See also Rob Stein, States Revising Organ-DonationLaw, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2007, at Al;

Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States System of Organ
Donation, The International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And the
Winner Is... ", 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 8 (1995).
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See id.
16. See infra Section III.B. 1-2.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. See generally Walter Block, et al., Human Organ Transplantation:Economic &
Legal Issues, 3 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 87, 87-109 (2001) (discussing current organ
donation laws and analysis of proposed changes to the system); S. Gregory Boyd,
Consideringa Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 417, 435-58 (2003) (offering
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various proposals for encouraging donation, including how current tax
policy affects donation. Overall, the past and present state of the law shows
continuous resistance to the notion of a market for organs or tax benefits for
donating.
A. Regulation of Blood and Organ Donation
Regulation of blood and organ donation is based on society's beliefs
regarding the human body, in particular, society's belief concerning
whether a person possesses a property interest in his or her body and if so,
what type of interest. By providing an overview of the historical
development of the law regarding property interests in the human body and
exploring current regulation of blood and organ donation, this section
provides a basis for understanding and evaluating the potential for various
proposals and their likelihood for success.
Early conceptions of property rights in the body were divided into views
on property rights in cadavers and rights in living organs and tissue.1 9 This
distinction had a significant impact on scholars' views of whether a person
held a property interest in his body, and whether a person had the ability to
control the disposition of his body. 20 Thus, this distinction frames the
examination of the historical development of the law regarding property
rights in the human body.
1. Early Conceptions of Property Rights in the Human Body
At common law, one could not hold a property interest in a cadaver.21
Lord Edward Coke "considered the property status of the cadaver implicit
in his etymological derivation of the word cadaver, caro data vermibus,
flesh given to worms, and, therefore, the property of no one., 22 Although
the Catholic Church attempted to assert that it possessed temporal and
jurisdictional power over human remains around 750 A.D. after the
a survey of the most influential laws pertaining to the sale of human organs);
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

DAVID PRICE,

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000)

(providing a review of the ethical principles and positions underpinning organ transplant
laws); THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE (Arthur L. Caplan &
Daniel H. Coelho eds., Prometheus Books 1998) (presenting a compilation of essays on the
legal, ethical, medical, sociological, and political issues surrounding organ transplantation).
19. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 9.
20. See generally id. at 9-20 (providing an overview of the development of perspectives
on property rights in cadavers, living organs, and tissues).
21. Boyd, supra note 18, at 436 n.148 (citing RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY
182, 186 (Viking Press 1981)); Charles M. Jordan & Casey J. Price, First Moore, then
Hecht: Isn't It Time We Recognize a PropertyInterest in Tissues, Cells and Gametes?, 37
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151, 172 n. 120 (2002).

22.

Boyd, supranote 18, at 436.
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beginning of burials in churchyards, the English courts stated in Regina v.
Sharpe that no property rights in corpses existed.23 Early American courts
similarly rejected the notion that absolute property rights existed in the
human body. 24 Today, American (and English) courts recognize a quasiproperty right in corpses, for example, in the disposition of remains. 25
However, even this right is limited by the rights of coroners and medical
examiners to examine the body.26 As will be discussed in Sections II.A.2.d
and e, a person's property right in a cadaver is further limited today by the
prohibition on purchasing or selling body parts for either transplantation or
therapy.27
Unlike at death, valid property rights have existed in living bodies. At
common law, a creditor could force payment of a debt by court-ordered
imprisonment of the debtor.28 A woman's body was once considered the
property of her husband. 29 However, the most obvious example is the
30
institution of slavery, under which an owner held an absolute ownership
right in another human being, including the right to profit from a slave's
body. 3' The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which outlawed slavery, implicitly affirmed that former slave owners
previously held property rights in other human beings.32

23. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 9.
24. See Keyes v. Kenkel, 78 N.W. 649 (Mich. 1899) (declaring that an action for
replevin of a human corpse could not succeed). But see Brian G. Hanneman, Body Partsand
Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 399, 404 (1993)
(discussing one American court's decision to bestow a quasi-property right in corpses for
next of kin).
25. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 10.
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
28. Bernard M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J.
142, 144 (1977).
29. Id.
30. Theoretically, a slave owner's interest in a slave was not absolute because the
murder of a slave by an owner constituted a crime. "In former times, the murder of a slave
in most, if not all the slaveholding regions of this country, was, by law, punishable by a
pecuniary fine only." WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND

ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 178 (American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 1853). By 1853,
murder of a slave was "punishable with death in every State." Id. However, because of the
"exclusion of all testimony of colored persons" and numerous exceptions to this rule of law
(e.g., killing of slaves who resisted in any form was not murder, death of a slave because of
harsh punishment was not murder), in reality an owner's property interest in a slave was
essentially absolute. Id. at 178-82.
31. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 11.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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2. Current State of the Law Regarding Property Rights in the Human Body
More recently, courts have been inclined to hold that people have a
limited property interest in their bodies.3 3 Today, some types of human
tissues are legally traded. Bodily tissues and fluids, including blood,
semen, and hair, are legally bought and sold. 34 "However, jurisdictions are
split over whether the sale of blood is the sale of a product or the provision
'
of a service. 35
The case law regarding whether an individual possesses a
property interest in his or her body and its components is complex and
inconsistent. Three notable cases dealing with the issue of property rights
in biological specimens, including tissue and cells, extracted from a living
person are Moore v. Regents of the University of California,36 Hecht v.
Superior Court,37 and Washington University v. Catalona.3 8
a. Moore v. Regents of the University of California
The issue in Moore was whether a person continued to own his tissue
after it was removed from his body for research purposes without his
consent.39 John Moore was diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia and sought
treatment at UCLA. 40 During seven years of periodic visits, samples of
blood, sperm, bone marrow, and skin were removed with Moore's
consent. 4' Moore was told that the removal of his body tissues and spleen
was necessary for his health; however, they were also used by a researcher
for commercial development. 42 Moore was not informed that his physician
was selling his cells for a substantial amount of compensation.4 3 Moore
brought a claim of conversion, claiming a proprietary interest in each of the

33. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Wash.
Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
34. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 11.
35. Id. at 12. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp. 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y.
1954) (holding that blood transfusions were a service, not a sale of a product when
determining whether to apply strict liability to a hospital for undiscoverable defects in
blood). But see, e.g., Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp. of Queens, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969) (characterizing transaction with blood bank as a sales transaction).
36. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
936(1991).
37. Hecht is a collection of three cases: Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Kane v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
38. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
39. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
40. Id. at 480-81.
41. Id. at481.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 482.
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products created from his cells or the patented cell line. 4 In response to
Moore's claim for conversion, the California Supreme Court held that
although Moore had a valid cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty for
the doctor's failure to disclose his conflict of interest, Moore could not
claim an ownership interest in the patented cell line and its resulting
products. 45 The court reasoned that Moore had no claim of ownership
because the patented cell line was legally and factually distinct from
Moore's cells.46 Through its decision, the court refused to "extend the
existing law of conversion to Moore's tissues because his rights could be
protected under [a theory of] breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
The court viewed the legislature as the more appropriate forum for making
new policy regarding property interests in the human body.4 8
In reaching its decision, the Moore court recognized the tremendous
impact any other holding would have had on research because of
researchers' need for access to tissue or cells for their work.49 Accordingly,
the Moore decision attempted to strike a balance between protecting Moore
and not impeding research. By basing its decision on lack of informed
consent, the court protected both Moore and research, 5consequently
0
refusing to recognize a property interest for Moore in the cells.
b. Hecht v. Superior Court
The issue in Hecht was whether a decedent's preserved sperm vials that
remained after his suicide were the property of the decedent's estate and, by
extension, whether he had a property interest in those vials and could direct
their distribution. 51 The court distinguished the facts in Hecht from those in
Moore by explaining that there was an explicit contract with the sperm bank
in Hecht that evidenced the decedent's intent.52 The court concluded that
the "decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
he had decision-making authority as to the use of his sperm for
reproduction. 5 3 Such interest was sufficient to constitute "property" within
44. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482-83.
45. Id. at 483, 492.
46. Bernard M. Dickens, Living Tissue and Organ Donors and PropertyLaw: More on
Moore, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 73, 77 (1992).
47. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 13.
48. Id.
49. Jordan & Price, supra note 21, at 163-64.
50. Id.
51. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). In this
case, two adult children sought to prevent the decedent's girlfriend from obtaining the vials.
Id. at 278.
52. Id. at 281.
53. Id.
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the meaning of the California Probate Code.54 Based on this property
interest, the decedent's preserved sperm vials were the property of his
estate, and therefore he could direct their distribution.55 The significance of
the Hecht court finding such a property interest is that it permitted the donor
decedent to direct the disposition of a part of his body, the sperm.56
c. Washington University v. Catalona
The issue in Catalona was whether individuals who knowingly and
voluntarily donate their biological materials for research retain an
ownership interest that would allow that individual to direct the transfer of
such material to a third party.57 Dr. William J. Catalona, a urologist
employed by Washington University in St. Louis ("the University"),
collected biological samples and associated clinical data during prostate
cancer surgeries. 58 He was instrumental in establishing the Genitor-Urinary
Biorepository ("Biorepository") to house the samples used for genetic
oncology research. 59 The Biorepository housed 100,000 samples, only a
small percentage of which came from Dr. Catalona's patients.6 ° In 2003 Dr.
Catalona left the University, intending to continue his research at
Northwestern University. 61 Prior to his departure, Dr. Catalona sent a letter
to his patients, their relatives, and other research participants requesting that
the recipient sign a release form directing the University to release their
samples to him.62 The University asserted that it owned the samples, and
neither Dr. Catalona nor the individuals who provided the samples retained

54.

Id.

55. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that neither a
husband or wife, who were getting a divorce, "had a true a property interest in... frozen
pre-embryos, although they had an interest in the nature of ownership, including the control
of the disposition of the pre-embryos."). The court permitted the donors to direct the
disposition of the embryo but not because of a property interest. Id.
56. In a similar decision, an Iowa state court ruled that the parents of a critically ill man
could donate the man's semen to his flancee. In that case, the man did not have a will and
did not expressly refuse to make the gift, and thus the court ruled that his parents could have
discretion over his body and could donate the sperm to the fiancee. Kathryn Fiegen, Judge:
Family Can Give Son's Semen to Fianc~e, IOWA CITY PRESS CITIZEN, Sept. 14, 2007, at IA.
This case is notable because it did not require evidence of intent on the part of the donor.
57. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 670.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 671-72.
61. Id. at 672.
62. Catalona,490 F.3d at 672.
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the research participants
ownership rights.63 Dr. Catalona claimed that
64
him.
to
samples
their
of
transfer
the
could direct
The court held that "individuals who make an informed decision to
contribute their biological materials voluntarily to a particular research
institution for the purpose of medical research [do not] retain an ownership
interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the transfer of such
materials to a third party. '65 The court based its decision on Missouri gift
law, reasoning that the donors' actions constituted inter vivos gifts because
the research participants who provided the samples possessed present
they delivered the
donative intent to make the gift to the University,
66
samples, and the University accepted the gift.
The Catalona and Hecht courts were both substantially persuaded by the
67
evidence of intent regarding the disposition of the tissue.
Evidence of
donative intent in Catalona included signed informed consent documents
on University stationary that characterized the transfer of tissue to the
University as a voluntary "donation" for use in studies by "Dr. William J.
Catalona and/or colleagues"; an accompanying brochure that characterized
the donation as "free and generous gift[s] of [biological materials]";
previous research and material transfer agreements; University intellectual
policies; and researchers' (including Catalona's) past practices.68 Further,
the court concluded that the research participants "unquestionably delivered
their biological materials" to the University, which "retained absolute
possession. ' 69 Although not discussed in the court's analysis, the court
noted in its recitation of the facts that the University provides the majority
of the funding to maintain and operate the Biorepository, with the
remainder of the funding coming from public and private grants provided to
the University as the grantee.7 °
The previously discussed cases are at the center of the controversy
regarding whether property rights exist in the human body, and if they do,
63. See id. at 672-73.
64. Id. at 672.
65. Id. at 673. However, the donors do retain other property rights in their donated
tissue. Each tissue donor in Catalonaretained the right to withdraw his or her consent to use
his or her tissue at any time. Id. at 674. See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2006) (stating
that research subjects may discontinue their participation in a research study at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subjects are entitled).
66. Catalona,490 F.3d at 674-76.
67. Id.; Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
68. Catalona,490 F.3d at 674-76.
69. Id. at 674-75. Further, although not discussed in the court's analysis, the court noted
in its reaction of the facts that the University provided the majority of the funding to
maintain and operate the Biorepository, while the remainder of the funding came from public
and private grants provided to University as the "grantee." Id. at 670.
70. Id.
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the extent to which such rights exist. 7 1 Outside of cases like Moore, Hecht,

Catalona,and their progeny, the ability to possess a property interest in the
human body, and thereby direct the disposition of body parts including
blood and organs, is controlled by the National Organ Transplantation Act
("NOTA") and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"), which has
been adopted in either its 2006, 1987, or 1968 form by all fifty states.72
These statutes prevent the sale of organs and determine the legal methods of
procurement and distribution of organs.73
d. National Organ TransplantationAct
NOTA regulates procurement, distribution, and transplantation of
organs.7 4 NOTA explicitly prohibits the sale of human organs for valuable
consideration.7 5 The definition of "human organ" does not include blood,
sperm, or ova. 76
However, NOTA permits donors to be legally
compensated broadly for organ donation, including transplant cost, travel,
and lost wages.7 7 Other than these exceptions, the prohibition is absolute.
Any violation of NOTA is punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000 or
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.78
To create a controlled environment in which organs could be
transplanted in an ethical manner without the troubling questions of
compensation, Congress established in NOTA the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network ("OPTN"). 79 The OPTN is a unified transplant

71.

The issue of property interests in the human body extends beyond debates about

transplantation and blood transfusion. Most recently, the idea of explicitly recognizing a
property interest in cells has been at the center of the controversy regarding the use of stem
cells to cure a multitude of diseases.
72. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
73. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274g (2000 & Supp. IV 2004);
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 14-15 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 28-30 (Supp. 2007).
74. National Organ Transplant Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274g (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000). The statute does not define valuable consideration, but
states that it "does not include the reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a
human organ in connection with the donation of the organ." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2000).
76. A "human organ" is defined as "the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any
other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation." 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2000).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000) (discussing what "valuable consideration" does not
include).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000).
79. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, About OPTN, History,
http://www.optn.org/optn/history.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
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network operated by a private, non-profit organization 80 and overseen by
the Department of Health and Human Services. 81 The United Network for
Organ Sharing ("UNOS") was awarded the initial82 contract to operate the
OPTN and continues to operate the network today.
Under this system, statutorily regulated state or regional non-profit
entities called Organ Procurement Organizations ("OPOs") are "paid
acquisition fees to recover organs from donors. 8 3 Hospitals pay OPOs for
matched organs, while the patients are responsible for paying the hospital
for the procedure, costs of organ procurement, and any other costs
associated with the transplant.8 4 Given the regional nature of this system, a
significant burden is placed on the states to regulate and encourage
donation.
e. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
Initially, states sought to protect patients and increase the supply of blood
and organs by adopting the UAGA.8 5 Created almost sixteen years before
NOTA, the UAGA was adopted as an effort by the National Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws to "facilitate the transplantation of hearts and
kidneys" and to protect transplant patients.8 6 The UAGA was intended to
replace the "patchwork of [state] laws" that existed prior to its creation,
which many people felt were "inadequate, confusing, and lacked
uniformity," thereby making donation law difficult to understand for
potential donors or recipients.87 As time passed, certain inadequacies were

80.
81.

Id.
Boyd, supra note 18, at 462.

82.

Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, History, http://www.optn.org/

optn/history.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
83. Boyd, supra note 18, at 462.
84. These costs can be substantial. Heart, lung, pancreas, and liver transplant costs are
now approximately $191,000, while the cost of a bone marrow transplant is "only"
$137,000. These costs are only for the procedure, not for any other care required before or
after the procedure, such as chemotherapy, immune system treatments, or other needs.
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, HospitalInpatient Statistics, 1996 Healthcare
Cost and Utilization Project Research Note, AHCPR Publication No. 99-0034, available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/charts/5proced.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
85. Boyd, supra note 18, at 455.
86. Id.
87. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 14. The Prefatory Note to the 1968 UAGA
states:
The laws now on the [state] statute books do not, in general, deal with these
[issues regarding anatomical gifts] in a complete or adequate manner. The laws
are a confusing mixture of old common law dating back to the seventeenth
century and state statutes that have been enacted from time to time.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT Prefatory Note (1968), 8A U.L.A. 70 (2003).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2008

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 17

identified in the original 1968 version of the model law.88 In response to
these inadequacies, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") revised the model law in 1987.89 The NCCUSL
amended the model law again in 2006 to make the UAGA consistent with
the organ procurement system developed under federal law and modem
transplant practices. 90
The UAGA, in its 2006 form, has been adopted by twenty states. 9' Eight
states currently retain the 1987 version of the UAGA 92 and twenty-two
states still retain the 1968 version.93 The statute, in its 2006 form, allows
88. Jordan & Price, supra note 21, at 157. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (revised 2006),
8A U.L.A. 8-37 (Supp. 2007).
89. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT Prefatory Note (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 3 (Supp.
2007).
90. Id.
91. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-841 to -850 (Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-171201 to -1223 (2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156.5 (West 2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-101 to -125 (West Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-3401 to
-3425 (Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-2-16.1-1 to -21 (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 142C.1-.18 (West Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-17-101 to -312 (2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 451.500-.590 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.M. STAT. §§ 24-6B-1 to -25
(Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130a-412.3 to -412.33 (Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
23-06.6-01 to -23 (Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.6.1-1 to -25 (Supp. 2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-26-48 to -72 (Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-101 to -120
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-28-101 to -125 (Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-291.1
to -.25 (Supp. 2007); Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, ch. 681, 2007 Or. Laws;
Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, ch. 127, 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws; Darlene Luther
Revised Anatomical Gift Act, ch. 120, 2007 Minn. Laws. Legislation to adopt the 2006
version of UAGA is currently pending in many states, see, e.g., L.D. 1505, 123rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Me. 2007); A. 3909, 212th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2007); H.B. 1637, 60th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
92. ALA. CODE §§ 22-19-50 to -59.7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19a-270a to -280a (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327-1 to -14
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 291-A:1 to -A:16 (LexisNexis
2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5238-5248 (2000 & Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 68.50.520-.640 & §§ 68.50.901-.904 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-1 to -14
(LexisNexis 2006); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 157.06 (West 2006).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2710-2719 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.510-.546
(West Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-140 to -151 (1991 & Supp. 2001); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/1-1 to 50/5-50 (2006); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.165-.247 (LexisNexis
2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:2351-:2359 (2001 & Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 2901-2911 (2003 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-501 to 512 (LexisNexis 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 113, §§ 7-14 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. §§ 333.10101-.10109 (2001 & Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 4139-31 to -53 (2005); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 194.210- .307 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 714801 to -4812 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:6-57 to -65 (West 2007); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 4300- 4310 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.02.101 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2201-2218 (West 2004
& Supp. 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 8611-8624 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-310 to - 420 (2002 & Supp. 2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 692.001-.016 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -119
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adults to make an anatomical gift during the life of the donor for the
purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or education. 94 It also sets
forth guidelines and procedures that must be adhered to by those involved
in the removal of organs and their use in research or transplantation. 95 It
"only applies to sales or parts intended to be recovered from a decedent
after death for transplantation or therapy., 96 Similar to NOTA, the UAGA
prohibits the sale of organs, although it only does so if "[the] removal of..
[the body] part...

is intended to occur after the...

[death of the

decedent]. 97 The UAGA does not discuss whether property rights exist in
"replenishable tissues," like blood, sperm, or ova. Thus, current law
permits the sale of these types of tissues. 98 In addition, when addressing the
sale of replenishable body fluids, "most states have statutorily characterized
such fluids as a type of service rather than as a sale of a good." 99 The
reason for this characterization is not for tax purposes, but has implications
for the tax treatment of organs and other tissues. 00° It protects donors and
suppliers from product liability for injuries that stem from blood or other
fluid.1 °1
The UAGA recognizes corporeal property rights in the human body and
authorizes individuals to make anatomical gifts of their bodies or parts and
permits individuals other than donors, such as agents acting under a healthcare power of attorney, parents of unemancipated minors, and guardians, to
02
make anatomical gifts on behalf of a donor during the donor's lifetime.
This view is consistent with the UAGA's explicit prohibition on the sale of

(2007). Alaska has incorporated the UAGA into the Health Care Decisions Act. ALASKA

§§ 13.52.170-250 (Supp. 2006).
94. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2007).
95. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 14-15 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 28-30 (Supp.
2007).
96. Id. cmt.
97. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16(a) (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 2007).
However, the 2006 version does "allow certain individuals to make an anatomical gift for
another individual during that individual's lifetime. Health-care agents under a health-care
power of attorney and, under certain circumstances, parents or a guardian, have this power.
The donor must be incapacitated and the permission giver has to be the individual in charge
of making health-care decisions during the donor's life." The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, available at
(last visited
http://www.anatomicalglftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=l&tabid=67
Nov. 23, 2007) (explaining the changes made by the NCCUSL to UAGA in the 2006
version).
98. Jordan & Price, supra note 21, at 159.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2007).
STAT.
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a body part after death.' °3 Thus, the "UAGA applies
to anatomical gifts
04
which take effect on or after the death of the donor."'
Both the UAGA and NOTA identify a quasi-property right in the human
body and its parts, but neither law declares an absolute property right in
them. The two statutes make a crucial distinction between selling and
donating organs, but they blur this distinction by failing to address blood,
sperm, and ova. During life, persons may donate non-vital organs, and at
death they may donate any and all of their organs under these statutes, but
people may never donate or sell life-necessary organs while alive. When
combined with case law, these statutes create a highly controlled and
limited property right in the human body. This regulatory environment
substantially affects the ways in which society can encourage donation
using traditional economic motivations.
B. Tax Treatment of Blood and Organ Donation
The current quasi-property right status of blood and organs significantly
affects the ability of the government to encourage donation through tax
policy. The classification of donations as property or a service is critical
because under Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, "[n]o deduction is
allowable.., for a contribution of services." 10 5 The Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") "has long considered the donation of blood as more akin to
the rendering of a nondeductible 'service' than the contribution of
'property.' 10 6 Thus, blood donations are not tax deductible. 10 7 As a result
103.

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §

16(a) (revised 2006), 8A U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 2007).

104. Jordan & Price, supra note 21, at 160.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-1 (g). The regulation does permit reasonable expenditures for
meals and lodging, but this provision amounts to a reimbursement for the indirect costs of
donating, not a payment for donating or an indication of society's gratitude for the donor's
gift.
106. Frederick R. Parker, Jr. & William J.Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply,
42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 89, 89-90 (2003) [hereinafter Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and
the Blood Supply]; Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234 (T.C. 1980) (holding that
plasma is property that may be sold for a profit but recognizing society's historical
reluctance to classify the human body as property). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 53-162, 1953-2 C.B.
127 (concluding blood was more akin to a service than the contribution of property). But see
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,418 (Sept. 15, 1975):
The decision to disallow a charitable contributions deduction for a blood donation
was controversial when it was made and we doubt whether the same decision would
be made today. Rev. Rul. 162 focuses on and emphasizes the act of donating blood
as a service in disregard of the substance donated. It followed the rationale that the
donation of blood is more in the nature of a rendition of a personal service than a
contribution of property because it involves the performance of an operation upon
the person of the blood donor.... Such a position ignores the fact that today blood
is a commodity with a commercial market and a value apart from its donor. To be
consistent with the rationale for Rev. Rul. 162, one would have to say that where a
taxpayer wants to donate clothes to the Salvation Army and is required to walk two
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of the classification of blood and perhaps organs10 8 as a service rather than
property, an odd dichotomy exists in which a person who donates money or
stock to a hospital will be entitled to a tax deduction, while a person who
donates blood and an organ will not.
Another reason the current tax code prohibits a taxpayer from taking a
tax deduction for donating blood is because it is not considered a long-term
capital gain. As Frederick Parker and William Winslade explain in their
article Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, "[als a general rule, a charitable
deduction is measured by the fair market value of the donated property...
[but] only to the extent the property would have generated a 'long-term
capital gain' had it been sold."10 9 If the donated property would not have
created this type of gain, the deduction would be limited to the donor's
basis in the property. 10
A sale of property generates a long-term capital gain if it is a capital asset
and the owner held the property for more than one year.1 11 Assuming, that
human blood would likely be considered a capital asset, 12 the second
requirement, that the owner hold the property for more than one year,
effectively denies a charitable deduction for blood donors as "red blood
'13
cells have an average finite life of approximately four months."
Therefore, donors could not deduct the fair market value of their
contribution, even if that value is determinable. 14 Rather, donors can only
deduct their basis in the blood, which is zero." 5 It is likely, therefore, that
even if the IRS considered blood to be property that qualified for a

miles to a depository, the taxpayer is rendering the personal services of delivery and
not contributing property. Permitting the blood to be withdrawn, and thereby
delivering it to the donee, does not render the blood worthless as property
donated.... [Bilood itself is undoubtedly property.
Id. See generally Frederick R. Parker, Jr. & William J. Winslade, Organ Procurement and
Tax Policy, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 179 (2002) [hereinafter Parker & Winslade,
Organ Procurement and Tax Policy] (suggesting that tax treatment of the sales and
donations of blood and breast milk provide context such that one might anticipate that
donation of organs might also be considered a service).
107. See Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90, 92
nn.9-10.
108. Id. at 89-90.
109. Id. at 90; 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2000).
110. 26 U.S.C. § 170(e) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
111. 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(e), 1221, 1222 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
112. The assumption that human blood would be included in the "inventory of the
taxpayer" is reasonable given that it would seem odd not to consider something produced by,
and coursing through, one's body anything but a capital asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (2000).
113. Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1986).
114. Parker& Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90.
115. Id.
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charitable deduction, the taxpayer would only be able to claim a deduction
of zero. This problem would not be an obstacle, however, for organ donors.
In addition to not being considered property, another obstacle to
implementing organ and blood donation tax deductions is that the ability to
take a charitable deduction under current law is expressly limited to
contributions made "to or for the use of' a qualified charitable
organization.' 1 6 Organ donations and some blood donations are made
directly to an individual because organ and blood donations must go to a
compatible recipient. Thus, many donations would not likely satisfy the
requirement. 7
A taxpayer could assert that the organ is donated to UNOS or the
hospital, but this assertion is incorrect for two reasons. First, UNOS and
the hospital are not the recipients; they are merely the vehicle through
which the donation is made. Because the beneficiary of the gift is known at
the time of the donation (or shortly thereafter), it would be incorrect to
claim the gift was made to the hospital or UNOS. Second, the intent of the
gift is not to benefit UNOS or the hospital. The intent is to benefit a
specific individual who is ill, particularly in the case of gifts to relatives. A
case could be made for completely anonymous gifts of organs at death, but
these donations are still ultimately given to an individual. The argument is
stronger for blood donation, specifically because typically blood from blood
drives is sent to a blood bank rather than immediately given to a particular
individual. This circumstance probably passes the charitable organization
requirement, but would still fail the long-term criteria explained above.
Thus, the current tax treatment of blood and organ donation denies any
form of charitable deduction or other beneficial treatment for either blood
or organ donation.
III. A CRITIQUE OF DONATION

SYSTEMS

The reality of the regulatory and tax environment is that the demand for
human organs considerably outweighs the supply." 18 In response, several
different proposals have been suggested. Some scholars advocate the
creation of a market system for organs, such as a direct payment system," 9
futures market, 120 or a death benefit system.121

Other scholars have

116.

26U.S.C.§ 170(c)(2000).

117.
118.

Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90.
See generally Kingsbury, supra note 1 (discussing the severe shortage of organs

and blood that is available for transplant and transfusion).
119. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 25.
120. Shelby E. Robinson, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for
Compensating Organ Providers,70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1019, 1037 (1999).
121. Id. at 1038.
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proffered non-economic alternatives, such as systems based on presumed
consent,122 mandated choice,123 paired organ exchange system, 124 or mutual
insurance. 2 5 This section examines and critiques these proposals.
A. Commercial Donation Systems
Perhaps the most common suggestion to encourage blood and organ
donation is the adoption of a commercial, or free market, system in which
people would be permitted to buy, sell, and exchange blood and organs.
The free market alternative comes in three main forms: direct payment,
futures market, and a death benefit system.
1. Direct Payment
The idea of permitting sale and procurement of organs has been raised
frequently since the very advent of blood transfusions and organ
transplants. 26 For example, H. Barry Jacobs formed the International
Kidney Exchange Ltd. in 1983 to broker human kidneys, charging between
$2000 and $5000 for its services, which excluded the actual acquisition and
medical procedure costs. 127 Jacobs's
plan involved procuring kidneys from
28
indigent third-world residents.
Jacobs's plan produced virulent opposition. The plan's opponents
included the American Society of Transplant Surgeons, the Association of
Independent Organ Procurement Agencies, the American Society of
Transplant Physicians, and the National Kidney Foundation. 129 Opponents
argued that "the selling of organs raises numerous ethical questions,
including the possibility that transplant operations will be available only to
the rich and that the organ donors will be poor."' 130 Future Vice President,
then U.S. Representative, Albert Gore said, "Putting organs on a market
basis is abhorrent to our system of values .... It seems to be something
inconsistent with our view of humanity .... Prostitution is illegal for
reasons that are similar. So is slavery.' 131 Jacobs admitted that many of the

122.

Lauren Siegel, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation,49 EMORY L.J.

917, 948 (2000).
123. Id.
124. Michael T. Morley, Increasing the Supply of Organsfor TransplantationThrough
Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 221,223 (2003).
125. Siegel, supra note 122, at 949.
126. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 26.
127. Id.
128. Robinson, supra note 120, at 1036.
129. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 26.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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they "could
potential donors would be unable to read, but he argued that
13 2
conversations.
recorded
tape
through
consent
give informed
Although the idea of direct payment seems shocking, it remains an idea
that has many advocates. Its advocates argue that with proper controls, a
free market in organs will help people by enabling them to gain access to
more organs at lower costs. 133 They assert that some individuals who are
34
otherwise unwilling to donate their organs may wish to sell them.
Moreover, this system would allow both the donor and the recipient to
benefit from the monetary reward and the much-needed organ.135 From an
economic perspective, this system would create an efficient vehicle for
transferring organs from person to person. In addition to these direct
benefits to the donor/donee and the efficiency benefit to society, there is
another argument in favor of a free market system: if blood and organs are
the property of an individual, that individual should have the right to
her blood or organs in any manner that is not otherwise
allocate his or 136
against the law.
While the arguments in favor of a free market system emphasize the
ability to increase the number of organs quickly and the rights of donors to
a
direct the disposition of their blood and organs, critics state that such 37
system would have a disproportionately negative impact on the poor.'
Critics argue that the effect would be to create a market in which people sell
out of need, essentially being coerced to sell their organs. 138 It is not clear
whether it is possible to obtain informed, voluntary consent from either the
donor and/or his or her next-of-kin, as applicable, in the face of the
possibility of immediate economic gain. A free market system would also
"unfairly allocate organs: access to organ transplants should not be a
function of the financial ability to buy organs."' 39 Beyond placing a social
cost on those least able to bear them and favoring those most able in the
allocation of organs, a commercial system would also discourage organ
donations and altruistic values, perhaps ultimately causing people to
"diminish [their] respect for themselves."'' 40 Finally, as discussed in
132. Id.
133. See id. at 28-29.
134. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 28-29.
135. Id. at 28.
136. For example, it would not be permissible for a donor to direct the disposition of his
or her blood or organs in such a manner that harmed himself or herself (e.g., killing oneself
to sell organs) or that would pose a public health risk (e.g., selling blood that is contaminated
with HIV).
137. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 13, at 37.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 36.
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Section II, it can be asserted that society does not view the human body as
property in the traditional sense, in response to those who argue that
individuals should have the right to allocate their blood or organs as they
deem appropriate because it is property. 4' Because the human body is not
property in the traditional sense, the argument is that individuals do not
have the same rights to direct the disposition of their blood or organs in any
manner they desire because of a societal interest in that body.
2. Futures Market
Another proposal suggests compensating organ donors through the use of
a futures market.1 42 Under this system, during a person's lifetime he or she
could sell the right to remove their organs at death, thereby creating a
contractual relationship between the organ provider and buyer. 143 A buyer
could be an individual, a government agency, or other private entity. 44
The advantage of this system, beyond an increased supply of organs, is
that it would prevent the sale of organs by anyone but the decedent, thereby
reaffirming personal autonomy. 145 Proponents also argue that it would
"prevent the reliance on live organ bearers.' 1 46 However, many of the same
concerns remain under this proposal, including coercion of the poor,
inability to obtain informed consent, and the lack of an altruistic intent in
their actions. In addition, the risk for family conflict is substantial under
this system. 47 The financial interest in a family member's organs could
appear when that person makes the contract to sell her organs, producing a
situation in which an incentive would exist to murder that person or for that
person to commit suicide. 48 Just as in a direct payment system, the poor
would be disproportionately impacted.149 A person might feel the need to
sell their organs, in this case by ending their life, to provide for their family.

141.

See infra Section II.A.

142.

Robinson, supra note 120, at 1037. See, e.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the

Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1

(1989) (advocating the use of a futures market to increase the supply of transplantable
organs).
143. Robinson, supra note 120, at 1037.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1037-38.
146. Id. at 1038.
147. Id. at 1046.
148. Robinson, supra note 120, at 1046.
149. Id. at 1046-47.
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3. Death Benefit System
Other commercial systems are non-market based. 150 One example of this
type of proposal is the death benefit system. A death benefit system
compensates organ donors by providing financial incentives to the persons
designated by the decedent, primarily the decedent's family., 51 Under this
system, the incentive would not be offered until the donor was brain dead
and would not be paid until the organs were harvested. 152 Families or other
persons would not be required under this system to accept compensation. 153
Although there is less concern for the issues of family conflict and
coercion of the poor under this system, they are still present. Additionally,
a death benefit system also poses the problems of inability to obtain
informed consent and lack of altruistic purpose that are present in other
commercial donation systems.
Thus, questions of altruism, coercion of the poor, inequitable allocation
of organs, creation of family conflict, and basic morality plague each
proposal. To a lesser extent, issues of wasted compensation for unusable
organs, the difficulty of matching provider and recipient, poor quality of
organs, abuse of the system, and the fair market value of an organ, cause
many to question both the morality and practicality of compensation-based
organ donation. 154
B. Noncommercial Donation Systems
In response to these moral and practical considerations facing
compensation systems, noncommercial donation systems have been
proposed. Three prominent types include presumed consent, mandated
choice, and mutual insurance.
1. Presumed Consent
Presumed consent systems, which are common in Europe, "provide[] that
' 155
organs will be automatically donated at death, unless stated otherwise."
This method is often called an "opt out" plan because if a person does not
wish to donate his organs upon death, he must "opt out" during life. 156 The
advantages of this system are that it would increase the available supply of
organs and "save hospital workers the difficult task of discussing organ
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Robinson, supra note 120, at 1038.
Id. at 1042-44.
Siegel, supra note 122, at 948.
Id.
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donation with grieving family members."'' 57 However, given the magnitude
of the decision to donate organs, many people find the notion of silence
serving as consent unsettling.1 58 In the eyes of many scholars who
emphasize the importance placed on personal autonomy by Americans,
"[t]he forced nature of presumed consent is antithetical to American
culture."1 59
2. Mandated Choice
Mandated choice is very similar to presumed consent, except that under
mandated choice individuals must either "opt in" or "opt out"; there is no
presumption of "opting in."' 160
Proponents argue that this increased
flexibility allows for more autonomy, the lack of which is the main
criticism of presumed consent.16' Similar to the presumed consent method,
it would relieve the hospital staff from the burden of having to discuss the
issue of donation with the grieving family, and instead place the burden on
individuals to think about and plan for death. 62 The largest criticisms of
this proposal are that the costs of coordinating mandated choice would be
massive, because every citizen's organ donation preference would have to
be recorded and followed, and that autonomy would63 still be sacrificed,
though to a lesser degree than with presumed consent.
3. Paired Organ Exchange System
One of the most recent proposals is the creation of a paired organ
exchange system. 6 4 Under this proposal, patients in need of organ
transplants would be paired with families and friends of patients also on the
waiting list to exchange non-vital organs. 65 This system would "facilitate
transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A
is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person
on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of
Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A.' 66 The
friend or family member of Patient A would donate on the condition that

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Siegel, supra note 122, at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Morley, supra note 124, at 223.

165.

See id.

166.

Id. at 224.
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the friend.or family member of B donates a compatible nonvital organ to
Patient A.i67
Proponents of this type of system argue that it preserves the altruistic
nature of the current donation system. 168 Also, paired organ exchange
would prevent commodification of organs by basing the exchange not on169a
free-market system, but rather on the shared desire to offer the gift of life.
Opponents, however, offer four main criticisms. First, under this system
only non-vital organs can be donated.170 Thus, the ability of this proposal to
increase the number of organs will be limited to certain types of organs.
Second, many commentators assert that it is immoral for a person to be able
to donate to a direct recipient of their choosing rather than the next
compatible person on the waiting list.1 7 ' These critics claim that donated
organs are a communal resource to be allocated according to publicly
established criteria, and not private property to be given or sold to another
person. 172 Third, many critics argue that this type of system is no different
a
from any other commodification of the human body; just as trading
73
person is wrong, trading parts of a person is equally inappropriate.1
Finally, opponents argue that this system amounts to coercion, because
family and friends will pressure a potential donor into consenting to save
the life of the other friend or family member. 74 Proponents argue that
coercing a compatible donor who refuses to donate is not immoral, but
rather the appropriate and normal action of a concerned family member. 175
In response, many scholars assert that coercion is intrinsically wrong and
that the only choice the actor can reasonably make is to donate or else face
"ex-communication" from his family and friends. 176 This threat of
coercion, along with the other criticisms, causes many 77people to have
serious reservations about a paired organ exchange system.1
4. Mutual Insurance
A mutual insurance pool operates by giving priority for transplants to
persons who agree to make their organs available in the future to other

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
See id. at 260-61.
See Morley, supra note 124, at 258.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at 257.
Morley, supra note 124, at 249.
Id.at 251.
Id.
See id.
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members of the insurance pool. 78 Within the insurance pool, standard
matching procedures, like those used by UNOS, would be used to
An example of this type of system 80is
determine prioritization. 179
LifeSharers, a no-fee network of approximately 9,000 organ donors.
LifeSharers members sign a document expressing their wish that they want
their organs to go to another LifeSharers member unless no member is a
suitable match.' 8 1
Mutual insurance provides a direct personal incentive to donate, thereby
increasing the supply of organs. 182 However, many ethicists have expressed
grave concerns about this type of "gated community" for healthy organ
donors. 83 Principally, this type of system is ethically questionable because
it requires patients to give something besides payment to receive the
medical treatment they require.' 84 Furthermore, a mutual insurance system
excludes any persons who are unwilling, such as for religious reasons, or
unable, such as for medical reasons, from having access to any organs of
mutual insurance pool participants. 85 Another drawback to mutual
insurance is that it would result in dividing individuals based on their level
of risk, akin to any other type of insurance.' 86 Although not based on
monetary incentives, this type of plan could lead to division based on ability
to participate because the quality or usability of an individual's organs, their
age, or another factor could impact the ability to participate in the insurance
pool.187 Finally, this type of system is hindered by the concept of adverse
selection as "high-risk persons are the ones most likely to participate in the
pool.' 88 To address this concern, LifeSharers members must sign up at
least one hundred eighty days before becoming ill.' 89 This issue could also
be avoided by having people enroll early in life, such as in childhood.' 90
178. Siegel, supra note 122, at 949.
179. See id.
180. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 53. For specific information regarding how LifeSharers
works, see Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.lifesharers.com/faq.asp (last visited
Nov. 23, 2007).
181. How Life Sharers Works, http://www.lifesharers.com/howitworks.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2007).
182. Siegel, supra note 122, at 949.
183. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 54.
184.
185.

See id.
Id.

186. Siegel, supra note 122, at 949-50.
187. Id. at 949. Mutual insurance inherently includes the problem of adverse selection
because high risk persons with organs that are either less suitable or not suitable for
transplantation are more likely to participate. Id.
188. Id.
189. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 53.
190. Siegel, supra note 122, at 949.
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Despite possible solutions to the adverse selection concerns, the larger
ethical issues set forth above remain.
IV. POSSIBLE TAX POLICY ALTERNATIVES

An alternative to compensation or noncommercial systems, which raise
serious ethical and practical concerns, is the use of tax policy to encourage
blood and organ donation. As Parker and Winslade state in their article Tax
Policy and the Blood Supply in which they advocate of the use of a
charitable deduction for blood donations:
[T]ax incentive[s] would enhance a potential donor's willingness to give
by reflecting the value society ascribes to the gift rather than by creating
an economic incentive in and of itself... [the tax incentive would be]
only a simple acknowledgement of generosity, a gesture of
9 1 appreciation,
or a token of esteem - not a financial incentive or reward.'
This type of favorable tax treatment would accomplish four important
objectives: "(1) provide an incentive designed to stimulate corporate
sponsorship of blood drives;'1 92 (2) in some manner recognize the generosity

of blood donors; (3) protect the safety of the blood supply; and (4)
accommodate established ethical norms."' 93 To accomplish these goals,
donations could be encouraged either by permitting a charitable deduction
for donating either blood or organs or providing a tax credit. This section
will explore both options, and explain why the tax credit is the stronger
proposal.
A. Offering a CharitableDeductionfor Donations
Allowing taxpayers to take a charitable deduction for donations of blood
or organs offers numerous advantages. First, it would preserve the altruistic
nature of donation. 194 Second, "it would not conflict with the ethical
proscription against the exploitation of disadvantaged groups.'

195

Because

the tax structure is progressive in nature, the value of the deduction would
become greater the more income earned by the taxpayer, and conversely, its
value would diminish the less income earned by the taxpayer. 196 At the
lower levels of the income scale the deduction would be "swallowed" by

191.
192.
because
193.
194.
195.
196.

Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 91.
Providing an incentive to stimulate corporate blood drives is especially important
they are the greatest source of blood donation in the United States. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 92.
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the personal exemption and standard deduction. 97 A charitable deduction
would not serve as a disproportionate incentive to the poor, but rather, using
a charitable deduction
might actually "unfairly deprive the less affluent
' 98
donor of a benefit."'
Third, it is unlikely that the tax incentive poses as significant threat to the
safety of the blood supply as would a direct cash payment. 99 Fourth, a tax
incentive would not produce an inequitable allocation of organs, but rather
would preserve the current allocation system under UNOS.2 °° Fifth,
offering a charitable deduction would not undermine the basic ethics
20 and
morality that underlie the current foundation of our donation system. '
Despite all of these advantages, implementing a charitable deduction for
donation would require significant alterations to the tax code and would
pose daunting administrative challenges. The tax code does not consider
the human body to be property and does not permit deductions for
contributions of services. 20 2 To allow a deduction, the IRS would have to
allow deductions for contributions of services or classify the human body as
property. Either change would be a significant policy shift. If the body
were to be considered property, the IRS would face many complicating
issues, including: (1) whether "during life or upon death, [a person] could
actually generate ... additional income, gift, or estate tax liability"; 20 3 (2)
how to determine the fair market value of the human body, organs, and
blood; (3) whether blood or organs constitute a long-term capital gain; (4)
the basis in a human body; and (5) whether some blood and organs are
worth more than others.20 4
These questions are complex and controversial. A strict interpretation of
the tax code would not make a distinction between a taxpayer who donates
blood or an organ and any other commercial activity. 205 "[F]or example,
the Tax Court has found that income derived from the sale of blood plasma
197. Id. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 63, 151 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
198. Parker& Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 92.
199. Id. Parker and Winslade offer little support for this proposition. They reference
general assumptions regarding the notion that the incidence of blood-borne disease is
inversely related to the donor's income. Although this correlation is possible, without more
evidence, it is not possible to be certain that a tax incentive could increase the safety of the
nation's blood supply. Id.
200. Id. It could be asserted that the allocation system under UNOS is not equitable, but
that question lies beyond the scope of this article.
201. See id
202. Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229, 1233-34 (T.C. 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A1(g). See infra Section lI.B.
203. Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 181;
Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90.
204. Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurementand Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 181.
205. Id.
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is conceptually the same as that generated by the sale of any other product,
without regard to 'the sanctity of the human body.' 20 6 Thus, "the excess of
the fair market value of [blood or organs] received over the cost or other
basis" of the transferred blood or organ constitutes taxable income.20 7
If it is taxable income, fair market value would have to be determined.
Courts have held that fair market value is "the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell... 20 8 Applying this notion to
the human body is exceptionally complex. Parker and Winslade state,
"[t]he very idea that a 'willing' buyer could act without 'compulsion' in a
contract involving the exchange of a life-giving thing is an anomaly of
thought., 20 9 Furthermore, as discussed in Sections II.A.2.d and e, "the law
precludes the existence of a legitimate market in which buyers and sellers
may trade in these 'goods' .... ,210 This fact does not "render them without
value, as the market in illicit drugs so readily attests," but it does make
valuation difficult and would likely prompt substantial debate and increase
the possibility of costly litigation.2' 1
To provide a charitable deduction for donation it would also be necessary
to determine the basis in a human body.2 12 Parker and Winslade explain
that:
Because we do not purchase our bodies or otherwise acquire them in a
transaction from which we can derive any identifiable cost, it would
appear that we have a basis of zero in these, our most physical of assets.
Accordingly, a participant in [an organ] exchange would realize income
in an amount
equal to the full value of the organ received, which could be
2 13
significant.
If the basis is not zero, would the basis in all bodies be equal? Since the
fair market value of the donated organ or blood would have to be
determined, would the blood or organ of a younger person be worth more
than that of an older person? Would the blood or organ of a healthy person
be worth more than that of a person who engaged in "unhealthy" activities
such as smoking or drinking? Would someone whose blood type is 0, the
most common blood type, be worth more or less than type AB, the least
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 182.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurementand Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 182.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.

212.

See id. at 183.

213.

Id.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol17/iss1/5

26

Clamon: Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation th

2008]

Tax Policy as a Lifeline

common type? 214 How would such values be substantiated? These are just
a few of many difficult questions that are created by such a system.
A charitable deduction for donation also has implications for the gift and
estate tax provisions in the tax code. 2 15 The IRS General Counsel stated:
If blood is property, then any part of the human body is property. Gift

tax is imposed.., on the transfer of property by gift. If any part of the
body is property then a gift tax should be levied on the gift of a kidney

for transplant if it is not given through a charitable organization.
Likewise, a taxpayer's estate includes the value of all property in which
he had an interest at death. The value of a decedent's body should
therefore be includible in his estate. In today's
world where transplants
216
take place daily, these issues are not illusory.
Finally, the current tax code requires that a charitable deduction be made
"'to or for the use of a qualified charitable organization."2" 7 The IRS
would likely have to either alter or clarify this regulation as well.
Accordingly, the tax code would have to be significantly amended to
provide a charitable deduction for blood or organ donation.
Implementing a charitable deduction poses other administrative
challenges. One administrative challenge, especially for blood donors, is
that donors would be subject to "the same substantiation requirements
imposed on taxpayers who claim deductions for other forms of charitable
contributions., 21 8 Another administrative obstacle is that current FDA
regulations require that blood be labeled as having been collected from
either paid or volunteer donors.219 Permitting a charitable deduction would
likely require either an alteration or clarification of these FDA rules.
Accordingly, there are administrative obstacles in addition to tax law issues
that would encumber implementation of a charitable deduction for blood or
organ donation.
B.

Grantinga Tax Creditfor Donations

The creation of a tax credit for donations is a less administratively
complex means of reaching the same objectives without opening the
Pandora's Box of deciding whether the human body is property and how to

214. This consideration is the most controversial because it involves factors over which
the donor has no control, as opposed to smoking or taking illicit drugs.
215. Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 18384.
216. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36.418 (Sept. 15, 1975).
217. Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90.
218. Id. at 91.
219. Id. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(5) (2007).
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determine the fair market value of a donor's blood and organs. Under this
proposal, a person would receive a tax credit for agreeing to be a donor.22 °
The tax credit system offers the same advantages as the charitable
deduction, but does not require the IRS to change its interpretation that the
human body is not property. Further, the tax credit would not require any
fair market value analysis of blood or organs. The credit would also
preserve the altruistic nature of the donation and would not exploit the
disadvantaged. 221 Additionally, a tax credit, like the deduction system,
would not pose a threat to the safety of the blood supply and would not
produce an inequitable allocation of organs. Similar to the charitable
deduction, a tax credit would not undermine the basic ethics and morality
that underlie the foundation of the current donation system.
As with almost all of the proposals made to date, the tax credit would
incur the same substantiation problems, FDA regulation issues, and the
question regarding the "to or for the use of' requirement as the charitable
deduction. Yet, unlike the charitable deduction, a tax credit would not force
significant changes to be made to the rest of the tax code. The IRS would
not have to choose whether to allow deductions for services or classify the
body as property. This problem is not created by a credit. A tax credit does
not raise sensitive questions regarding the fair market value of body parts
and fluids, or whether some people's organs and blood are worth more than
another person's blood or organs. People would neither have to claim their
bodies as assets upon their death nor would they have to determine their
basis. Thus, a tax credit offers the same benefits as the charitable deduction
without the statutory consistency problems created by a deduction. A tax
credit creates an incentive to attract potential donors without creating a
commercial market, changing the donation system to an "opt out" approach,
defining the body as property, or imposing any other significant policy
choices.
In almost all of the literature on methods of encouraging organ donation,
five main concerns are consistently raised: (1) destroying the benefits of
altruism; (2) coercion of the poor; (3) inequitable allocation of organs; (4)
creating family conflict; and (5) concerns of basic morality.2 22 A tax credit
for blood and organ donation does not raise any of these concerns, but
rather protects the values they espouse.

220. For specific details as to how a tax credit would work, see Section V's model
statutes.
221. It might, however, serve as a disproportionate incentive to the poor in the same
manner as the charitable deduction. Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply,
supra note 106, at 92.
222. Robinson, supra note 120, at 1044-47.
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Moreover, the tax credit proposed would attain at least three of the four
objectives set forth by Parker and Winslade in their charitable deduction
proposal: (1) recognizing the generosity of donors; (2) not endangering the
safety of the blood supply; and (3) accommodating established ethical
norms. 223 The fourth objective, encouraging corporate sponsorship of blood
drives, 224 could easily be accomplished by creating a provision in the
proposed tax credit statute offering corporations a tax credit for organizing
blood drives. 225 Similar to the individual incentive in the model statute in
this article, which gives incentives for donating more than once, the credit
could increase for each additional blood drive, up to a defined limit.
Two issues that must be addressed to use a tax credit to encourage blood
and organ donation are whether the tax credit should be refundable or
nonrefundable and when the taxable event is realized and recognized such
that the taxpayer may obtain the tax credit. Parker and Winslade propose
the use of a refundable tax credit, which can reduce one's tax liability below
zero. 226 "[A] refundable credit is applied first to reduce or eliminate one's
tax liability, with any unused amount being paid out to the taxpayer in cash;
the amount of any credit in excess of the recipient's tax liability would, in
effect, represent a government subsidy to him. 2 27 A refundable tax credit
would therefore not only cause the federal government to lose essential tax
revenue, but would also force the government to spend money that could
otherwise be allocated to address other significant public policy issues.
Refundable tax credits are typically used only in circumstances where the
government wishes to allocate money to achieve a fundamental societal
objective, for example the earned income tax credit is intended to assist the
poor.228
Taking into consideration the economic implications of a refundable tax
credit, in particular its impact on the availability of government resources
for other public policy priorities, this article proposes the use of a
nonrefundable tax credit, which would not permit taxpayers to receive a
refund if their tax owed was reduced below zero. This type of credit would
attain the objective of encouraging donation, but would not financially
overburden the government. Blood and organ donation could effectively be
encouraged through the use of a nonrefundable tax credit without requiring

223.
224.

Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 90-91.
Id. at 91.

225. The use of a tax credit for individuals might reduce the need for a corporate
incentive since individuals would be personally incentivized to donate.
226. See Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, supra note 106, at
175-76.

227.
228.

Id. at 176.
See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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the government to spend money that could be used for other public policy
purposes. Further, if empirical data demonstrates after several years that
the nonrefundable tax credit provides insufficient incentive, the tax credit
could be transformed into a refundable tax credit if necessary.
The second issue concerning the timing of when the taxable event is
realized and recognized has significant implications for organ donation.
Should a person realize and recognize the tax credit when he or she pledges
to donate blood or organs? Or should it be when a person actually makes
the donation? For example, if a person promises to donate her organs at the
time of death when she is twenty-five and she dies at eighty-five, may she
obtain the benefit of the tax credit at twenty-five or at the time of her death?
This issue is not as significant for blood donation, because blood donation
can generally occur immediately within a given fiscal year in which the
taxpayer seeks the tax credit. Parker and Winslade propose a refundable tax
credit that is realized and recognized at the time when the taxpayer agrees
to donate his organs irrespective of when death occurs.229
This article proposes the use of a tax credit that must be realized and
recognized at the moment of donation, not upon a promise of future
donation because it achieves the stated objective of encouraging donation
while avoiding potential conflict that might arise under a system in which
persons could take the tax credit prior to actual donation. The IRS does not
treat a contribution as permanently set aside unless the chance that the
contribution will not be applied to the donor's intended charitable purpose
is so remote that it is negligible. 230 As discussed earlier, the chance that a
potential organ donor's contribution will not be applied is not remote, but
231
rather substantial
Parker and Winslade intelligently suggest that a database, akin to the
National Practitioner Data Bank, could be used to document a taxpayer's
promise to donate and that such a promise would thereafter make donation
mandatory.232
Further, Parker and Winslade pragmatically suggest
immunizing providers from liability when they rely in good faith on the
database when retrieving organs.233 These solutions, though beneficial, are
insufficient. Given the history of conflict over donative intent, disputes
between family members regarding organ donation, and questions of
capacity of the donor, substantial controversy and costly litigation is likely
229.
230.
196.

Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 175.
Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-2(d) (as amended in 2004); Rev. Rul. 66-347, 1966-2 C.B.

231.
232.
78.
233.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Parker & Winslade, Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, supra note 106, at 177Id. at 178.
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to arise under such a system. This conflict is avoidable if the tax credit is
permitted only at the time of donation. As discussed above, this position is
consistent with current IRS guidance.234 Thus, a nonrefundable tax credit
realized and recognized at the time of giving is a unique vehicle through
which blood and organ donation can be encouraged, while guarding against
the hazards of a commercial system and maintaining the current tax
treatment of charitable giving and the human body.
The following are two model statutes that offer guidance as to how a
nonrefundable tax credit section in the tax code might operate. These
statutes are by no means the only way a tax credit could work. They are
intended to be but one example of how donation could be encouraged
through the use of a nonrefundable tax credit.
§ XXX. Qualified Blood Donation Programs
(a) Allowance of credit.
(1) In general. - There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year with respect to each
qualifying donation of blood products by the taxpayer an amount
equal to the per donation amount.
(2) Per donation amount - For the purposes of paragraph (1), the per
donation amount shall be determined as follows:
In the case of any taxable year in The per donation amount is which the taxpayer donated blood
products:
Once in the taxable year
$500
Twice in the taxable year
$1000
Three to six times in the taxable $2000
year 235

II

(b) Limitation based on adjusted gross income (1) In general - The amount of the credit allowable under subsection
(a) shall be reduced (but not below zero) by $50 for each $1000 (or
fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
exceeds the threshold amount.
(2) Threshold amount. - For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
"threshold amount" means (A) $110,000 in the case of a joint return

234. See Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-2(d) (as amended in 2004); Rev. Rul. 66-367, 1966-2
C.B. 241.
235. Normally a person may safely donate blood every eight weeks. Thus, six times per
taxable year is the maximum number of times that should count towards the tax credit.
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(B) $75,000 in the case of an unmarried individual, and
(C) $55,000 in the case of a married individual filing a separate
return.
(c) Qualifying blood product donation - For purposes of this section (1) In general - The term "qualifying blood production donation"
means any donation of(A) Blood products derived from human blood used for
purposes of transfusion into another person or for federallyapproved biomedical research.
(B) Any other products formulated via removal of human blood
used for purposes of transfusion into another person or for
federally-approved biomedical research.
(d) Blood products - For purposes of this section (1) In general. The term "blood products" shall include human
blood of any type, red blood cells, white blood cells, platelets,
plasma, and any other federally-approved blood-derived product that
may be legally donated under the National Organ Transplant Act.
(2) Sperm, ova, and hair are not covered by this section.236
(e) Donation to self exception (1) In general. The term "qualifying blood product donation" shall
not include the removal of human blood from one individual and
replacement of that blood into the same individual at the same or a
later time.
§ XXX. Qualified Organ Donation Programs
(a) Allowance of credit. (1) In general. - There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year with respect to each
qualifying human organ donation(s) by the taxpayer an amount
equal to the per donation amount.
(2) Per donation amount - For the purposes of paragraph (1), the per
donation amount shall be(A) $5,000 for the donation of at least one human organ to
either another individual or individuals, a medical center for
donation to an unspecified person(s), to the cause of science.
(B) $10,000 for the donation of all of the taxpayer's organs to
either another individual or individuals, a medical center for
donation to unspecified person(s), to the cause of science.

236. Sperm, ova, and hair are excluded because there are sufficient supplies to meet the
demand for these items. This policy decision could always be reversed if more donations
were ever required.
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(b) Limitation based on adjusted gross income (1)There shall be no limit on the amount of credit allowable under
subsection (a) based on adjusted gross income.
(c) Qualifying organ donation(s) - For purposes of this section (1) In general - The term "qualifying organ donation(s)" means any
donation of:
(A) A part or structure of the human anatomy adapted for the
purpose of some specific function or functions.
(B) Sperm, ova, and hair are not covered by this section.2 37
(d) Donation to self exception (1) In general. The term "qualifying organ donation" shall not
include the removal of human organ(s) from one individual and
replacement of the organ(s) into the same individual at the same or a
later time.
V. CONCLUSION

The demand for blood and human organs will continue to grow as
society's ability to save and improve lives by transplanting more parts of
the body increases. To have any chance of meeting the ever-increasing
level of demand for blood and organs, the current donation system must be
modified to encourage donation in order to substantially increase the
Some
quantity of available healthy, compatible blood and organs.
individuals, such as pure altruists, "would donate without any external
stimulus, ' 238 while others would never donate regardless of the incentives
offered. Some may be attracted to a direct compensation system, but many
people vehemently object to such an outright offer of remuneration. 239 A
reasonable alternative is the use of a tax credit as an incentive to "attract the
attention of those potential donors who wouldn't be willing to sell their
blood in a purely commercial transaction" but who would accept favorable
tax treatment as a "token of public appreciation of their generosity. '240 ' 24It
1
may even "arouse existing but dormant inclinations toward altruism.
For these reasons, tax credits are an effective, ethically acceptable, and
perhaps even ethically preferable means of encouraging blood and organ
donation.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra note 236.
Parker & Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, supra note 106, at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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